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So What's in a Name? A Rhetorical Reading of
Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Act
J. Christopher Rideout *
Society likes these nice, tidy definitions-"mentally ill,""criminal," "sane." Well, some of these people don't fit
these categories. They just attack, repeatedly, over and
over.1
Mother of a Seattle woman who was raped and
murdered
Language lies at the intersection between legal authority
and human experience. Not surprisingly, then, that legal
authority is encountered through rhetorical conventions. They
shape it, if not create it. A constitution is a written document;
its ethos emerges from its words. The very fact that the
authority of the law lies within the conventions of language
offers us some control over the law. It becomes something
other than force; ideally, it becomes our agent.
The convention most commonly recognized in discussions
of the language of the law is that of interpretation. Does a
baby carriage violate an ordinance prohibiting vehicles in the
park? The answer lies, not within any abstract conception of
law, but within the interpretive acts brought to bear upon the
language of the ordinance.2 Some might respond that the ques-
tion is a silly one. Parks are meant to be enjoyed by the public
and that enjoyment includes families. Baby carriages clearly
belong there. With such a response, the interpretation has
simply turned to another convention of language-narrative.
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1982, University of Washington. The author would like to thank Alesia Pinney-
Hawkins for her research assistance and David Boerner, Sid DeLong, John La Fond,
Stuart Scheingold, and Geoff Watson for their helpful comments.
1. Barry Siegal, Locking Up "Sexual Predators," L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Al,
A31 (quoting Ida Ballasiotes, mother of Diane Ballasiotes, who was raped and
murdered in Seattle in September 1988).
2. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forewor& Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1983). Cover asks this old question and notes that
"interpretive commitments must be used to answer it." Id.
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It has begun to tell a story.3
Steven Winter has characterized this intermediary and"meaning-constituting" position of language in the law as an
"agon," a struggle between the power of the law, with the
abstracting and generalizing tendencies inherent in its use of
language, and the fuller, more concrete meanings provided by
narrative.4 In Winter's view, narrative meanings lie closer to
the plane on which we live our lives, and thus he finds that
reconstructing the narratives that underlie the law has gained
considerable appeal in recent legal scholarship.'
The attraction of narrative is that it corresponds more
closely to the manner in which the human mind makes
sense of experience than does the conventional, abstracted
rhetoric of law. The basic thrust of the cognitive process is
to employ imagination to make meaning out of the embodied
experience of the human organism in the world. In its pro-
totypical sense as storytelling, narrative, too, proceeds from
the ground up. In narrative, we take experience and config-
ure it in a conventional and comprehensible form. This is
what gives narrative its communicative power.6
Nonetheless, Winter acknowledges that narrative as a form of
discourse does not wholly fulfill the institutional functions of
the law.
On the other hand, narrative is not the primary medium
for the kind of institutionalized meaning that is necessary if a
prevailing order is to make its claims of legitimation and justi-
fication persuasive.7 "Narrative does not meet the threefold
demands of generality, unreflexivity, and reliability that are
3. Others might respond that, within its plain meaning, "vehicle" simply does not
mean baby carriage. They would be relying, however, upon the most common and
everyday of interpretive acts-that of framing the word within its ordinary usage by
some generalizable speech community called "the public." Still others might respond
that city officials never intended such an ordinance to apply to baby carriages; that
response, however, also relies upon the construction of a narrative. For a discussion of
the interpretive practices brought to bear in the law, including intentionalism, see
STANFORD LEVINSON & STEVEN MAILLOUX, INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A
HERMENEUTIC READER (1988).
4. Steven Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989). The phrase "meaning-constituting"
comes from Cover, echoing James Boyd White, supra note 2.
5. Winter, supra note 4, at 2228. The symposium containing Winter's article is
dedicated to legal storytelling. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
6. Winter, supra note 4, at 2228.
7. Id.
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necessary if a prevailing order is credibly to justify itself."'
Winter concludes that narratives are important in that
they help shape, or constitute, the social experiences to which
the law responds, but he acknowledges that they are not the
final, institutionalized form in which the law codifies
meaning.9
In this Article, I will examine this socially constitutive
function of narratives in the enactment of Washington State's
Sexually Violent Predators Act.'0 This Act is a prime recent
example of how social narratives-in this case, narratives of
violence, pain, and outrage-lie behind the official language of
the law. As Winter would point out, narrative was the vehicle
that prompted legal change." The question for this Article,
however, is what happens once the story has been recast into
another form, here that of a statute? How well do the immedi-
acy of the details and the authorial voice of the story lend
themselves to the generalized and categorizing language of a
rule?
The immediate answer is, no doubt, not well at all. I
would like to take this Article a little further, however. In
some instances, and perhaps in this one, traces of the originat-
ing narrative voice remain. Are those traces sufficient? To
what extent can the authority of a narrative survive transla-
tion into the structure of a legal rule, with its own forms of
legitimacy and persuasion?
The Article will begin, in Part I, "Story-telling," by look-
ing at the originating narratives that led to the demand for a
change in Washington law regarding violent and predatory sex
offenders. In Part II, "Translating," it will then examine the
rewriting of these narratives into the form of a legal rule,
Revised Code of Washington ("RCW") 71.09, the Sexually Vio-
lent Predators Act. Part III, "Reading," contains a detailed
analysis of the language of RCW 71.09, exploring the ways in
which statutory language attempts to embody meanings that
had their origins in the very different form of narrative. This
section will also comment on the ways in which the language
8. Id.
9. Id. On the role of narrative in shaping social reality, see Jerome Bruner, The
Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1 (1991).
10. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91).
11. Winter, supra note 4, at 2228. "Mhe highest use and greatest facility of
narrative is as an iconoclastic tool of persuasion to legal and social change." Id.
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of RCW 71.09 is subtly persuasive, but necessarily falls far
short of the persuasive immediacy of narratives.
In Part IV, "Consequences," this Article will look at two
recent challenges to RCW 71.09, as a way of asking how effec-
tively the ethos, or moral imperative, of the original narratives
can survive translation into the form of a legal rule. When a
statute is challenged in an appeal, the original narrative, as
embodied in the language of that statute, faces competing nar-
ratives, each with its own moral claims. And all of these nar-
ratives face translation again, into the judicial opinion, the
written form of the judges' responses to the voices, exper-
iences, and languages of which these narratives were
composed.
The law offers one of the central forums in which we tell
the stories of our experience. The law also has its own rheto-
ric, however, whose meanings originate in narratives but
whose forms are different. In the debate about Washington's
Sexually Violent Predators Act, this Article attempts to
remind us that the voices, and the pain, of those originating
narratives linger, vestigially, in the subsequent writings of the
law, whether in the language of the statute, of the briefs, or of
judicial opinions. It is beyond the scope of this Article to sug-
gest the appropriate response of the Washington courts to the
law. But that judicial response, insofar as it must encounter
and acknowledge the imperatives woven into the narratives of
human experience, cannot escape the deeply ethical nature of
the stories that we tell about ourselves, including those told by
the law.
I. STORY-TELLING
Anyone who lived in the Puget Sound area during 1988
and 1989 and who read the local newspapers encountered the
shocking stories about the abduction, rape, and murder of
Diane Ballasiotes in Seattle12 and, roughly eight months later,
the rape, strangling, and mutiliation of a seven-year-old boy in
Tacoma.' 3 Both crimes seemed so gruesome and extreme that
they elicited an immediate cry of rage from the community,
first to capture the assailants and then, especially after the sec-
12. Dave Birkland, Jailed Man a Suspect in Slaying, THE SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 4,
1988, at Bi.
13. Bruce Rushton, Past Sex Offender Suspect in Attack, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE
(Tacoma), May 22, 1989, at Al.
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ond crime, to change the law so that convicted sex offenders
would not have the opportunity to repeat their crimes. The
narratives of these events were told repeatedly in local news-
papers, on television, on radio news shows, and in conversa-
tions among family and friends.
The crime in Tacoma elicited the most insistent response
from the community for some kind of legislative remedy, not
only because it followed so closely the crime in Seattle, but
also because a child was the victim.1 4 The personal horror of
the attack and the boy's subsequent efforts at recovery
emerged vividly through the voice of his mother, Helen
Harlow, who was willing to speak publicly. Only three days
after the attack, she granted interviews with the press from
the hospital where her son was recovering, sharing her anger,
pain, and uncertainty with reporters.15 The rest of the commu-
nity quickly joined her in her rage.
The local newspaper ran an editorial the same day, asking
for a community response. 16 The headline read "An Offense
that Calls for Outrage" and was followed by text that spoke for
the feelings of the community: "First there's the horror,
shock, and revulsion.... Then there's the outrage, frustration,
and confusion .... [These] feelings need to be vented and the
questions must be answered."' 7 The public, as if responding
directly to the editorial request, joined in a community voice
calling for change. Two days after the editorial, protestors
gathered on the steps of the state capitol, "venting their anger"
over the incident in what the newspaper called "a public out-
cry."'" Among the protestors was a brother of Diane Ballasi-
otes, the woman killed the year before in Seattle.
The protest on that Friday marked the end of a week in
which the community began acting on behalf of the moral
imperatives implicit in the story of the boy.
14. The victim advocates group that developed in response to the crime was called
the Tennis Shoe Brigade, a reference to the tennis shoe as a symbol of childhood
innocence and vulnerability. See Alex Tizon, Will 10,000 Tennis Shoes Get Gardner's
Attention?, THE SEATTLE TIMEs, June 18, 1989, at Al; Mark Matassa, A Message for the
Governor, THE SEATrLE TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1989, at C2.
15. Kathleen Merryman, The Little Boy Isn't Alone, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE
(Tacoma), May 24, 1989, at Al.
16. An Offense that Callsfor Outrage, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma), May 24,
1989, at A10.
17. Id.
18. Debby Abe, Gardner to Probe How System Failed, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE
(Tacoma), May 27, 1989, at A8.
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The rally was just the latest demonstration in a week of pub-
lic uproar. From Monday, when the scope of the Shriner
[the accused rapist] case became apparent, to 2 p.m. Friday,
the governor's office received 1,000 calls and letters about
the case. Milne [gubernatorial representative] said that's
probably the most correspondence the governor has received
on one issue in such a short time.19
The community quickly followed protests in the capitol with
community meetings, where hundreds of people blamed the
legal system and demanded changes. At one meeting, where
part of an overflow crowd was turned away, a psychologist who
specializes in treating sex offenders seemingly began the call
for a special category of offender when he groped for the
words to condemn those who molest children. "'The sadistic,
homocidal child molester, the pedophile-we don't know how
to treat them.... All we can do is lock them up.' ",20 The need
for a language, a label for people like these offenders, became
part of the task of the legislature, a task made more difficult
when attempted within the conventions of a rule rather than a
narrative.
Narratives can help shape the experience of a community
into a form that allows the public both to give meaning to and
to evaluate that experience.2 ' In the case of the Tacoma boy,
the narrative helped preserve the community's very sense of
its own identity and morality. It defined an act that struck the
community as way beyond the bounds of normal behavior and
as confounding to any sense of who a member of the commu-
nity should be.
During the public hearings, the accused, Earl Shriner, was
repeatedly referred to as if he were an animal, an outsider, a
man who had forfeited all rights. One police officer testified
that the only "cured" sex offender he knew of was a rapist
whom he had "shot dead." His listeners responded with "thun-
derous applause. '22 In the legislative debates over the pending
bill on sexually violent predators, legislators expressed similar
attitudes that people like Shriner were outsiders to the com-
19. Id.
20. Dan Voelpel, A Demand to Change the System, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE
(Tacoma), May 31, 1989, at Al.
21. The importance of normativity in narratives has been discussed both by Cover,
supra note 2, at 4-10, and Bruner, supra note 9, at 15-16.
22. Hal Spencer, Sex Offender Bill Cheered by Police, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE
(Tacoma), June 3, 1989, at B1.
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munity and should be treated as such. "'Voluntary mutilation
is too good for sex offenders,' said state Sen. Brad Owen (D-
Olympia). 'It should be mandatory for these creeps. The Con-
stitution was never meant to coddle these people, but that's
what we use it for.' "23
Responding to the voice of the community, Governor
Booth Gardner established the Governor's Task Force on Com-
munity Protection.24 Not surprisingly, the report of the Task
Force opens with a reference to the originating narratives:
"Governor Gardner created the Task Force on Community
Protection following the murder of a young Seattle woman by
an offender on work release and the brutal assault of a young
Tacoma boy."'2' Although the members of the Task Force
knew well the stories and testimony that had given rise to
their work, they nevertheless conducted six public hearings
across the state. As the members explained, they wanted to
"discover what citizens believe are the major flaws in our
state's laws regarding sexual and violent offenders."2 In other
words, given that the Task Force was formed in response to
the voice of the community, the members wanted to hear more
about the community's version of the story and about how the
community interpreted it. The Task Force also wanted to dis-
cover other stories of violent sexual predation.
In one instance, these additional stories moved the Task
Force to broaden the scope of its inquiry, looking at crimes
other than only those committed by strangers.
The injury caused by a rapist who is a stranger is often phys-
ical and very apparent. But the stories heard by Task Force
members in every community made it clear that the damage
inflicted by acquaintances and family members also causes
[sic] wounds which can endure for a lifetime. At the hear-
ings, citizens eloquently pleaded to add these crimes to the
Task Force's agenda.27
23. Siegal, supra note 1, at A31.
24. Exec. Order No. 89-04, Wash. St. Reg. 89-13-055 (1989). The Task Force
consisted of four legislators, plus people who had expertise with the criminal justice
system or with mental health civil involuntary commitment procedures. The task
force also had citizen members, including the mothers of Diane Ballasiotes and the
Tacoma boy.
25. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICES, FINAL REPORT I-i (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
26. Id.
27. Id.
1992]
788 University of Puget Sound Law Review
This admission offers further evidence of the compelling
nature of the narratives regarding sex crimes and their role in
inducing legislation that would somehow confine those repeat
sex offenders who posed a serious threat to the safety of the
community.
As the Task Force Report continues to describe the prob-
lem, however, it drifts away from the narratives and voices of
the public in its effort to legitimate and justify its view of the
severity of the problem.2" Later, for example, the arguments
turn to statistics and reports of experts to document the seri-
ous nature of sexual and interpersonal violence. The report
cites studies conducted by the United States Surgeon General,
by the Centers for Disease Control, by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, and by numerous social scientists." A rhetorical
turn like this in the argument is understandable, given the
severity not only of the crimes being examined but also of the
solutions proposed. In making laws, those responsible must act
upon comprehensive and reliable evidence; hence, the Task
Force had to determine what experts and professionals had
discovered nationally about sexual violence. In addition, the
scientific or quasi-scientific nature of this evidence lent an air
of objectivity and professionalism to the work of a committee
that had had its origins in community outcry.3 ° Nevertheless,
this change in the nature of the rhetorical authority, upon
which the Task Force relied later in the report, prefigures the
radical difference between the authoritative voice of the com-
munity with which the Task Force's work began and the rhe-
28. The Task Force, despite the broad representation of its membership, was also
more than a neutral or disinterested audience for these public narratives. It
represented one step in a political process that began with the governor's issuing of the
executive order and that continued into the state legislative session and the passing of
RCW 71.09. As a part of that process, both the Task Force and the Washington State
Legislature had to choose some means of translating the normative impulses of the
public's narrative into some appropriate model for criminal sanction, that model being
grounded in its own normativity. See generally HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968). A full accounting of that political process lies
beyond the scope of this Article.
29. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at IV-1 to IV-4.
30. To note that this kind of evidence provides the rhetorical effect of objectivity
is not the same as claiming that it is grounded in objective truths. For more on the
rhetoric of scientific discourse and the argued-for nature of its claims, see CHARLES
BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE: THE GENRE AND ACTIvITy OF THE
EXPERIMENTAL ARTICLE IN SCIENCE (1988); ALAN GROSS, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE
(1990).
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torical authority of the statute that was ultimately drafted and
enacted into law.
II. TRANSLATING
The Task Force Report lies at a point midway between the
originating social narratives of violence and the legislation that
was ultimately passed, a point of transition that offers an
opportunity to look at some of the differences between narra-
tives and rules. Clearly the narratives derived from the inci-
dents both of the Seattle woman and of the Tacoma boy are
horrifying and shocking; they contain an affective dimension.
In their concreteness and immediacy, they construct a world of
terrible aggression and violence. The details, largely avoided
in this Article, contribute to the nightmarish nature of these
events, even when fictionally reconstructed in the minds of the
listeners. Furthermore, these narratives are grounded in
experiences that have links to those of our own ordinary lives,
and thus they are readily comprehensible to us. We could have
been where these people were. We can imaginatively project
ourselves into these situations, even though to do so may be
terrifying.
These affective qualities, borne of the rhetorical conven-
tions of narrative, in turn can also make these narratives trans-
formative.3 ' Narratives invite us in. We imaginatively
participate, and we can do so in part on the basis of concrete
experiences that we share with the events depicted in the nar-
rative. But no narrative contains events that can wholly corre-
spond to the experiences of our own lives. Some events will be
depicted, albeit concretely, that are unknown or unfamiliar to
us. In this way, narratives sometimes also challenge our sense
of what is ordinary, and real. In the process, we must reshape
the manner in which we make meaning out of experience, and
we must rethink what we expect from it. When the narrative
is compelling, and successful, we develop a broader under-
standing of human experience and an empathy for the experi-
ence of others. These powers of narrative, long acknowledged
and felt, surely contribute to narrative's ability to elicit social
and legal reform. People in the Puget Sound area began to see
how something unthinkable was in fact possible, and they
asked for protection. 32
31. Winter, supra note 4, at 2277.
32. Spencer, supra note 22, at B1, B2. "I don't want to hear again that this person
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A problem arises, however, when narratives are translated
into the form of a legal rule.33 Although narratives may draw
upon a power to reconstruct unfamiliar and painful situations
in ways that can allow others to imaginatively participate and
that can spur reform, that same power becomes a liability for
the rule-maker. Every reconstruction relies upon the exper-
iences of the listener; each retelling is a reinterpretation.
Thus, narratives create a risk of indeterminacy and inconsis-
tency. Legal rules, on the other hand, must be applied consist-
ently each time.
Furthermore, every narrative is instantiated-it takes
place in a specific time and place, its setting. Thus, narratives
lack the generality required of rules. The concrete, specific
details of a narrative require translation into the structure of
categories and labels before the imperative embodied within
the narrative can be extended to other cases.
James Boyd White finds this translated structure of the
rule deceiving in its simplicity.' "Reduced to simplest terms,
the rule can be said to operate this way: a label is applied to
experience, and a consequence determined by the label is
imposed. The rule seems to reduce all experience to a single
descriptive term. 3 5 White quickly adds, of course, that rules
are not quite this simple.36 But he nevertheless finds that legal
rules necessarily conform to requirements for consistency
which obscure important parts of the experience that gave rise
to the rule.3 ' Every legal rule, he concludes, must find its
place between, on the one hand, a recounting and description
of human experience-story-telling-and, on the other, a kind
of abstract, precise categorizing and defining that, at its
extreme, would render the rule meaningless.38
According to both Winter and White, then, legal rules are
a specialized form of language that must respond to the human
experiences, and accompanying narratives, that gave rise to
them in the first place. Yet legal rules must also structure that
response in a way that allows them to be applied consistently
or that person fell through the cracks. I want the cracks filled." Id. at B2 (quoting Ida
Ballasiotes).
33. Winter, supra note 4, at 2260.
34. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 229 (1973).
35. Id. at 229.
36. Id. at 229-31.
37. Id. at 232-35.
38. Id. at 240.
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and reliably; legal rules have a rhetoric of their own. Given
the constraints of that rhetoric, how well can Washington's
Sexually Violent Predators Act retain the persuasiveness and
authority of its originating narratives?
III. READING
The Sexually Violent Predators Act does not wholly dis-
pense with the voice of community outrage that led to the
change in the law, but, in its opening section, the statute does
translate that voice into one based upon a very different kind
of authority. The statute begins with a section titled "Find-
ings," which relies upon the conclusions of the Task Force and
thus, by incorporation, upon the stories told about the two
crimes of 1988 and 1989.' 9 The narrative voice has changed,
however, from that of an angry public or even from that of
Task Force members, speaking with grave personal and profes-
sional concern, to the voice of the legislature.
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous
group of sexually violent predators exist [sic] who do not
have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropri-
ate for the existing involuntary treatment act.... The legis-
lature further finds that sex offenders' likelihood of
engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is
high.... The legislature further finds that the prognosis for
curing sexually violent offenders is poor, the treatment
needs of this population are very long term, and the treat-
ment modalities for this population are very different than
the traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate
for commitment under the involuntary treatment act.4°
This voice of the legislature is of course a rhetorical device, a
fictional voice, as if the voice of the people were being spoken
through their elected representatives. 41 Although this fictional
voice serves a purpose, partly ceremonial and partly legitimiz-
ing for the statute that follows, it lacks the concreteness and
immediacy of the earlier narratives. By means of the rem-
nants of a generalized narrative fiction, it is the voice of the
legislature. But it is no longer situated within the form of a
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. On this voice of the implied author, see WAYNE BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE
KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION 169-98 (1988); WAYNE BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION
70-77, 211-21 (1983).
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narrative, and so it lacks the type of presence that narrative
establishes so well. The voices of the actual legislators who
spoke to the legislation are missing, let alone the narrative
voices of the public and of the victims' families who spoke dur-
ing the spring of 1989.42
Nevertheless, a constrained fictional voice is allowed for in
statutory language. It is as close as a piece of legislation can
probably come to representing the voice of the people while
still conforming to generally accepted conventions for legisla-
tive drafting.43 Such conventions allow for a voice on behalf of
the people of the State of Washington, even if that voice is
somewhat generalized and has considerable distance from the
circumstances that gave rise to the statute. The generality and
distance are part of the rhetorical convention and reinforce the
guise of rationality and calmness within which legislation is,
purportedly, enacted."
Thus, despite the legitimizing function of this opening
voice, the constraints of statutory conventions weaken the rhe-
torical authority of rules as compared with that of narratives.
A close reading reveals other difficulties as well in translating
stories of horrifying violence, with their accompanying moral
imperatives, into the careful and precise language of the law.
In the narrative accounts of the two crimes that led to this
statute, the offenders acquire great presence by virtue of their
rhetorical place in the narrative as a main character.4" Charac-
ter in a narrative is best defined by action; the brutal acts
alone of these two men speak volumes about their character.
In addition, public response, well-chronicled in both narratives,
further defines the character of these men through the collec-
42. See, e.g., Siegal, supra note 1, at A31 (quoting Senator Owen).
43. See REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 186-87 (2d ed.
1986). In describing the basic elements of communication in drafting-author,
audience, written utterance, and context-Dickerson sees the concept of author as
posing "no significant problem" because the actual author of the legislation is always
writing on behalf of someone else. Id. at 26-27. This is a naive view of any drafted
document, including a statute. Dickerson ignores the complex nature of an author as a
rhetorical construct, representing not only actual authors but also the reader's
fictionalized version of who the author is.
44. James Boyd White has analyzed the voice of the Declaration of Independence,
noting how a similar voice of general detachment must necessarily give way to anger
and a call for revolution. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING
231-40 (1984).
45. See WAYNE BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION 227-91
(1988).
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tive voice of social opinion and commentary. 46 RCW 71.09
lacks these defining powers of narrative.
Given this lack, the "Findings" section must initially
define sexually violent predators.4 7 It does so by explaining
who they are not: "A small but extremely dangerous group of
sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental dis-
ease or defect that renders them appropriate for the existing
involuntary treatment act, chapter 71.05 RCW ... ."" The
first defining statement simply explains that these offenders
are not the same as the group of offenders described in an ear-
lier rule, RCW 71.05. In part, this section of RCW 71.09 is
addressing a perceived shortcoming in existing law. The ear-
lier law, RCW 71.05, had allowed for short-term treatment and
return to the community, precisely the condition that led to
public outrage over the 1988 and 1989 crimes; thus, it could not
offer a remedy. Given the need to establish a new category of
offender, the opening section of RCW 71.09 has asserted the
existence of this new offender. However, saying who a person
is not, which is the definitional strategy of this opening, is dif-
ferent from saying who a person is.
The "Findings" section of RCW 71.09 next tries to offer a
more positive definition of its category of offender; it can do so,
however, only in general terms: "In contrast to persons appro-
priate for civil commitment under chapter 71.05 RCW, sexually
violent predators generally have antisocial personality features
which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment
modalities and those features render them likely to engage in
sexually violent behavior."49 Apart from the admittedly gen-
eral nature of the definition, the sentence also refers to the
negative definition already offered ("features which are
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment") and then
offers a tautological description of the features ("and those fea-
tures render them likely to engage in sexually violent behav-
ior"). The tautology lies in the statement that sexually violent
predators have features that lead to sexually violent behavior.
The difficulty of offering a positive definition continues in
the next sentence, where the statute must now use the syno-
46. See supra text accompanying notes 12-23.
47. Chaim Perelman describes definition as a form of identification that is, at the
same time, a form of argumentation. See CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-
TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 210-18 (1969).
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91) (emphasis added).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
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nym "sex offenders" to avoid rendering this sentence as yet
another tautology. "The legislature further finds that sex
offenders' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory
sexual violence is high."'  Were the statute to use the label for
the category that it is establishing, the sentence would read
that sexually violent predators' likelihood of engaging in
repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. This potential
repetition demonstrates the descriptive nature of the label that
the statute uses. Because it is largely descriptive, the label for
the actor does not serve well in any sentence, such as the one
above, that also describes the act.
These difficulties do not necessarily illustrate flaws in the
statute. Rather, they point to the difficulty of retaining the
same rhetorical authority when moving from the language of
narrative to the language of legal rule and definition. Narra-
tives are concrete, self-contextualizing, and instantiated. They
are always located in the world, even if that world is imaginary
(as it is not here). They contain an authorial presence, a voice,
whose rhetorical authority serves as a guide to meaning.5'
Legal rules are general by necessity, 2 and, as mentioned
above, either contain much weaker authorial presence or, more
commonly, lack it altogether. Here, the "Findings" section
contains a thinly-stated echo of the people's voice translated as
a legislative voice. But when the section begins to define its
category of offender, it runs the risk of unraveling. Situated
outside the narrative of anger and protest, the people's voice,
as spoken through the legislature, lacks the requisite authority
to establish a clear guide to any generalizable meaning. The
statute's opening section no longer contains an authorial voice,
and it suffers from the absence of other supporting narrative
conventions. It could not do otherwise. Precisely because of
their inherent generality, mentioned earlier, statutes cannot
rely for meaning upon the concrete situatedness that narra-
tives do.
In a narrative, the nature of a person, the "character," is
defined by action, by voice (of both the narrator and the other
characters), and by style. In a statute, defining is done by
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. That meaning need not accord with the meaning implied by the narrative
voice; a reader can as readily disagree as agree with a narrative voice, but in either case
the voice serves as a guide to meaning. See BOOTH, supra note 45, at 169-98.
52. See Winter, supra note 4, at 2259-60 (discussing the differences between
narratives and legal rules).
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overt definitions. Hence, RCW 71.09 follows its "Findings" sec-
tion with a "Definitions" section, a normal and acceptable stat-
utory convention.53 The voice of the legislature, however, and
whatever rhetorical force it could offer, are now gone. The
definitions begin with "sexually violent predator," the category
of person to whom the statute applies and thus the primary
definition in the section. "'Sexually violent predator' means
any person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime
of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality
or personality disorder which makes the person likely to
engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. ' ' 4
Like many legal definitions, this one is stipulative.55
Although the definition contains common words with ordinary
meanings, here they are combined into a phrase whose usage is
somewhat different from what actual usage would be in an
ordinary speech community.' Definitions like this one are
usually stipulative because of the law's need for careful preci-
sion. Such precision is exercised in this statute so as not to
include any person in the category of sexually violent predator
who in fact is something else, even some other kind of sexual
offender. In addition, this definition proceeds by a rhetoric of
analysis, again because of the need for precision.' That is, the
section breaks down its definition into subclasses of larger
classes. Here, a sexually violent predator is a subclass of a
larger class-a "person who has been convicted of or charged
with a crime of sexual violence," and the definition distin-
guishes the sexually violent predator from the other members
of the larger class. The limiting language that creates the sub-
class, however, deserves further scrutiny.
In addition to its description of the larger class mentioned
above, the analytical definition of sexually violent predator
creates the subclass by describing persons who suffer from one
of two conditions: "a mental abnormality or [a] personality dis-
order which makes the person likely to engage in predatory
acts of sexual violence."
53. See DICKERSON, supra note 43, at 137-52.
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
55. "Stipulative definitions" create a meaning different from actual usage within a
speech community; "lexical definitions," such as those found in a dictionary, record
actual usage. See DICKERSON, supra note 43, at 138.
56. Id.
57. On the requirement that the language of the law be precise, see generally
DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 290-398 (1963).
58. See DICKERSON, supra note 43, at 139.
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The first condition, mental abnormality, is further defined
in subsection two. "'Mental abnormality' means a congenital
or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to the commission of
criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a
menace to the health and safety of others. '59 The definition, as
for subsection one, is analytical and is limited three times.
Mental abnormality is, first, a condition affecting capacity, sec-
ond, in a way that predisposes a person to commit a criminal
act, and third, that person thus poses a particular kind of
menace.
Much of this limiting language comes from other sections
of Washington laws. The larger class to which mental abnor-
mality belongs is defined as "a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity." 6 That language
echoes the definition of mental disorder in RCW 71.05.020(2):"any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has sub-
stantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or voli-
tional functions."61  Similarly, the definition of mental
abnormality in RCW 71.09.020(2) further limits this condition
as one which "predisposes the person to the commission of
criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a
menace to the health and safety of others. '62 This language
repeats almost verbatim the definition of sexual psychopath in
RCW 71.06.010, an older statute. That statute defines a sexual
psychopath as a person who suffers from a condition (in the
older statute, a "form"), "which form predisposes such person
to the commission of sexual offenses in a degree constituting
him a menace to the health and safety of others. '63
This borrowed language from the two existing statutes
allows the definitions in subsection two of RCW 71.09.020 the
assurance of using words whose meanings already exist,
legally, in other parts of the law; the range of their usages has
already been well-established by the courts. Although many of
the phrases in subsection two are striking for their general-
ity-"a congenital or acquired condition" and "emotional or
volitional capacity"-that generality is controlled and limited
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (Supp. 1990-91).
60. Id.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(2) (1989).
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (Supp. 1990-91).
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.010 (1989), repealed prospectively by 1984 Wash.
Laws ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)).
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by reference to other parts of the code. This reference is an
important means of definition in the law. Because legal mean-
ing is established through prior usage and confined by judicial
precedent, the law tends to rely upon similar words and
phrases for related definitions." To the degree of care, repeti-
tion, and detail already noted above in the "Definitions" sec-
tion can thus be added a kind of self-referentiality, in which
already-established legal meanings form the basis for the crea-
tion of new but related meanings. What this careful enclosure
of statutory meaning cannot include, however, is the ways in
which narrative meaning refers to and incorporates human
experience. The authority of narrative, relying upon concrete-
ness to evoke the memory of experience, has been supplanted
by an authority that depends upon precision and logical consis-
tency within the corpus of the law.
The second condition listed in subsection one, "personality
disorder," receives no further definition, probably because the
term itself has an accepted clinical definition.65 It does, how-
ever, receive additional qualification, and that qualification
descends into the tautological language already discussed above
under the section "Findings." That is, a sexually violent
predator is a person who suffers from a "personality disorder"
that results in "predatory acts of sexual violence."
This tautology, as mentioned earlier, reveals the difficulty
of translating the very strong normative impulses of narrative
into the objective, voiceless language of a statute. In the con-
text of a narrative, what constitutes a sexually violent predator
is readily understood; the whole is the sum of its individual
words, each word being readily comprehensible in ordinary
usage. Here, the statute cannot rely upon these ordinary
usages. Nevertheless, the continuing impulse toward repeti-
tion and tautology in the statute evokes the presence of the
story behind the statute, as if these words can speak for them-
selves, their meaning breaking through for anyone who knows
the story.
64. See MELLINKOFF, supra note 57, at 374-87.
65. According to the American Psychiatric Association,
Personality traits are enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and
thinking about the environment and oneself, and are exhibited in a wide
range of important social and personal contexts. It is only when personality
traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause either significant functional
impairment or subjective distress that they constitute Personality Disorders.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, DSM-III-R (3d ed. rev. 1987).
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The third definition in RCW 71.09.020, "predatory," is a
key definition in the statute. This word is important for char-
acterizing the type of sexual offender to whom the statute
applies. The noun form, "predator," appears more often in the
statute than does the adjectival form "predatory." As noted
above, however, that noun form "predator" is defined in sub-
section one as a person who engages in "predatory" acts, and so
a careful definition of "predatory" will, by virtue of the tautol-
ogy, also define "predator."
"Predator" is a word with strong connotations in its ordi-
nary usage.6 The common usage of the word indicates a gen-
eral rapaciousness and destructiveness. In addition, the word
is commonly applied to animals, and so when it refers to
humans, somewhat metaphorically, it carries over with it an
entailment of instinctual savageness. For these reasons, the
statute must carefully provide its own stipulative definition of
the word, to control the usage. The fact that the statute must
do so, however, points again to efforts within the language of
the statute to be tacitly persuasive. To acknowledge that this
statutory "predator" is unlike the commonly conceived
predator is to argue for a particular, and special, type of
predator. 7
Like the first two definitions discussed above, the defini-
tion of predatory is also analytical. It means "acts directed
towards strangers or individuals with whom a relationship has
been established or promoted for the primary purpose of vic-
timization. '"68 As do the other definitions, it begins with a
larger class, "acts directed towards strangers or individuals,"
and then isolates a subclass within it, "with whom a relation-
ship has been established . . . ." The narrative portion of the
Task Force Report (referred to earlier) 69 has already explained
the purpose for the alternative construction of either "stran-
gers" or "persons with whom a relationship has been estab-
lished."7 ° Another important definitional qualification comes
at the end, "for the primary purpose of victimization."'" Here,
the definition works almost by synonym, rather than tautology
66. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1785 (unabridged, Merriam-Webster, 1971).
67. See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 47, at 212-13.
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(3) (Supp. 1990-91).
69. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 25, at I-1.
70. Id.
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(3) (Supp. 1990-91).
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or repetition. "Predatory" means "victimizing." The synonym
has a common and vivid meaning in common usage, with a con-
notation that is sometimes associated with "predatory." The
statute has carefully allowed that connotation from common
usage to carry over into statutory usage.
The fourth definition, of "sexually violent offense," differs
from the other three in being a denotative definition rather
than an analytical one.72 Denotative definitions work by list-
ing. Subsection four lists, at considerable length, the types of
acts that would constitute a sexually violent offense. It care-
fully makes reference to other places in Washington law where
these types of offenses are defined. Because of the care of its
listing, this definition adds considerable detail to the "Defini-
tions" section. For example, part (a) of the subsection lists the
following:
[R]ape in the first degree, rape in the second degree by forci-
ble compulsion, rape of a child in the first or second degree,
statutory rape in the first or second degree, indecent liber-
ties by forcible compulsion, indecent liberties against a child
under age fourteen, incest against a child under age four-
teen, or child molestation in the first or second degree.7 3
The full list of subsection four seems exhaustive rather than
partial and thus allows for little or no ambiguity as to the acts
that fall within its domain.
This discussion has offered an excruciatingly close reading
of the first two sections of the Sexually Violent Predators Act,
but not without purpose. The point of the reading is, simply,
that the language of the Act must be persuasive language, even
if its available persuasive devices are somewhat limited. The
first persuasive device, the use of the voice of the legislature in
the opening section, echoed, although somewhat weakly, the
stronger rhetorical authority provided by the authorial voice of
some of the other narratives underlying the writing of the
statute.
The need for additional persuasion is created by the open-
ing sentence of the first section-"[t]he legislature finds that a
small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent
predators exist. ' 74 This finding is, of course, not a finding so
72. Id. § 71.09.020(4). On definitions by listing, see DICKERSON, supra note 43, at
139.
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(4) (Supp. 1990-91).
74. Id § 71.09.010.
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much as it is a construction. Such a category of offenders did
not exist previously, waiting to be discovered, but rather was
constructed by the legislature as a result of the investigations
of the Task Force. Those investigations themselves were a
reading and interpretation, in a sense, of the stories that the
Task Force had heard in hearings and testimony. The category
of "sexually violent predators" does not exist as a scientific cat-
egory, a "hard" fact that can rely upon a rhetorical authority
derived from another field; rather, the category must be
argued for. This is the initial task of the statute.
The second persuasive tactic in the statute is embodied in
the entire "Definitions" section, discussed above.75 This tactic
might best be called that of "presence," a matter of depicting
certain concepts in such a way as to call the reader's attention
to them and to elicit a sense of their fullness and presence.7"
The tactic is largely psychological.77 It might be viewed as
equivalent, although much less evocative, to the kind of con-
creteness that is one of the stock tools of narrative.
In RCW 71.09.020, presence is developed largely through
the construction of an analytical taxonomy. The section begins
by defining "sexually violent predator," but immediately fol-
lows that stipulative definition with a definition of each of the
major parts of the original definition. As noted earlier, some
of the definitions become tautological if read carefully, but the
section risks that tautology in order to repeat key terms-for
example, "sexual," "violent," "predator," and "predatory"-in
the first definition. Both strategies, that of enumeration of
parts and that of repetition, are common to the tactic of devel-
781oping presence.
The section also relies upon a third strategy, accumulation
of detail.79 This strategy might also have its counterpart in
narrative. Again, the diminished effect of this accumulation of
detail in the statute demonstrates, by contrast, the strong shap-
ing force that narrative lends to its own component parts, such
as narrative detail. In the statute, the first three definitions, in
their analytical delineation of a particular subclass, incorporate
considerable detail into the definition. The fourth definition,
75. See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 47, at 210-18.
76. Id. at 115-20; CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 35-36 (1982).
77. See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 47, at 116-18; PERELMAN,
supra note 76, at 35-40.
78. PERELMAN, supra note 76, at 37.
79. Id.
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by denotation, simply lists various acts that exemplify a sexu-
ally violent offense, but in the act of listing amplifies the con-
cept of sexual violence and its contribution to the presence of
the major concept of sexually violent predators. The longer
the list of acts, the stronger the presence.80 This final act is
important because the listing is referential; other violent sex-
ual offenses are invoked, and their existence lends status to
the existence of the new category of sexually violent predation.
The question remains of how to evaluate the rhetorical
effects of the statute.81 Two recent legal challenges to the con-
stitutionality of the statute provide an opportunity to investi-
gate its initial consequences.
IV. CONSEQUENCES
Shortly after the Sexually Violent Predators Act was
passed, two people were charged under the new law. Both
were convicted of being a sexually violent predator, and both
quickly challenged their conviction in the Washington State
Supreme Court. 2 With these charges and the accompanying
trials and appeals, the law had returned to the realm of narra-
tive. Any legal case revolves around a story, and part of the
trial process entails the narrative reconstruction of that story
in court.83
Opposing parties will, of course, reconstruct the story from
different points of view and, in certain respects, will tell some-
what different stories. In the appeals mentioned above, both
sides open their statements of the case by presenting different
versions of the appellents' characters. The prosecutor/respon-
dent's brief opens with three sentences that immediately estab-
80. I count 25 separate acts that would constitute a "sexually violent offense."
81. This statement may strike some as an odd way of looking at challenges to a
statute-the more common test being that of constitutionality. The two are not
unrelated. Any arguments about the constitutionality of the statute will surely look at
the ways in which the statute has defined "sexually violent predator." As argued in
this Article, definition is in part a device of persuasion, one important question being
its ability to establish rhetorical authority. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the
Washington State Psychiatric Association in Support of Petitioners, In re Young
(Wash. filed Sept. 20, 1991) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter WSPA Brief].
82. See Brief of Appellants, In re Young (Wash. filed Oct. 10, 1991) (No. 57837-1)
[hereinafter Appellants' Brief]. As of this writing, the court has not yet issued a
decision.
83. See generally LANCE W. BENNETr & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
REALITY IN THE COURTROOM (1981).
19921
802 University of Puget Sound Law Review
lish the subject as the type of person, or character, who could
be a sexually violent predator.
In the 28 years before this civil commitment action Was com-
menced, [the appellant] has been convicted of six felony
rapes. He has been at large in the community, with the
opportunity to rape, only 11 of those 28 years. All of appel-
lant's known rapes have been against adult female
strangers.8 4
The brief continues with the chronology of the appellant's sex-
ual offenses, each told with sufficient detail to lend strong nar-
rative authority to the type of character that the prosecution is
presenting.' In the narrative thus reconstructed, the appel-
lant is the primary agent in a saga of repeated episodes of rape.
His story, as told, defines him through character and action as
a sex offender who is violent and who preys upon women. The
brief establishes the character of the second appellant in the
same manner. 86
The brief filed by the other side also develops portraits of
the characters of the appellants, this time showing them as vic-
tims. In the narrative as reconstructed, the primary agent is
the law, represented by corrections officials and judges and
accompanied by state psychologists. The appellants are the vic-
tims of a procedural system that allowed them to be charged
and detained immediately upon their having already served
their sentences and upon their having been released from cor-
rectional facilities.s
In describing the second appellant, the brief also spends
several pages recounting testimony from family, friends, and
employers, as well as from the appellant himself, that he is a
victim of psychological inadequacies and social shortcomings
that account for his troubled character. He is portrayed as
being dyslexic and thus a high school dropout who accordingly
suffered from poor self-esteem and who was forced to accept
menial jobs.8 ' The testimony also notes his recent efforts to
overcome these problems, an effort at self-improvement of his
character.8 9
84. Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant State of Washington at 2, In re
Young (Wash. filed Oct. 29, 1991) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
85. Respondent's Brief, supra note 84, at 3-6.
86. Id. at 10-13.
87. Appellants' Brief, supra note 82, at 11-47.
88. Id. at 41-45.
89. Wayne Booth has recently described the strong tendency in Western
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These narratives, however, do not have the same rhetori-
cal status as the originating social narratives discussed earlier
in this Article. To begin with, they are conflicting narratives,
rather than a unitary narrative. At trial, the law tells, not one
story, but multiple stories.9 Each side offers a different telling
of the facts, emphasizing a different point of view. At the level
of the appeal, these conflicting stories continue to underlie the
arguments made. In fact, the heart of appellate arguments, in
certain respects, lies within the normativity of the underlying
stories, within the ethos that emerges from their telling. Here,
one story emphasizes the right of the community to be free of
harm from persons found to be extremely dangerous and
likely to repeat sexual offenses. The opposing story empha-
sizes the right of each citizen to constitutional safeguards such
as due process and equal protection. In its underlying ethos,
each story makes a compelling claim.
In addition, the narratives told at trial and in appeal are
constrained by the definitional and procedural boundaries of
the legal rule, RCW 71.09. Not surprisingly, then, each brief
recounts the testimony of psychological experts summoned by
both the state and by the defense. The state's leading psychol-
ogists carefully track the definitional categories of RCW 71.09
in finding that the appellants suffer from personality disorders
and mental abnormalities that indicate with a "reasonable psy-
chological certainty" that the appellants would again commit
predatory acts of sexual violence.9 Similarly, the defense's
expert witnesses attack the categories provided in the statute
and thus conclude that the state's labelling of the appellants
lacks predictive power or psychological validity.9 2
These arguments are all based upon defining and labelling
strategies that go beyond the concrete instantiation of charac-
ter provided by straightforward narrative. They are necessary
because of the shaping presence of the statute and its turn to
careful legal definitions as a substitute for the narrative device
of character. Interestingly, the rhetorical authority of those
legal definitions must be realized, and challenged, through the
testimony of psychological experts. The very qualities of the
statutory definitions that lend them their authority as part of a
narratives to portray character in terms of self-improvement. See BOOTH, supra note
45, at 230-37.
90. JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 174 (1985).
91. Respondent's Brief, supra note 84, at 7-8, 14-15.
92. Appellants' Brief, supra note 82, at 25-28, 39-41.
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legal rule-their generality and their differentiation from eve-
ryday usages and meanings-also preclude any straightforward
or self-evident reading of what they mean in a particular con-
text. They lack the concreteness of character in a narrative.
In accordance with current legal conventions and social norms,
the law turns outside to psychology, relying upon that disci-
pline's efforts to create categories and predict behavior in ways
that are warranted by empirical observations and systematic
methodologies. Thus, when the categories of the statute are
applied to real situations, the authority of the statutory defini-
tions must be backed by other forms of authority.
In addition, the statute's partial reliance upon psychologi-
cal terms becomes problematic because the purposes of the
statute and its definitions differ from the purposes of psychol-
ogy and its diagnostic categories. The statute must translate
stories about people who commit violent acts into a language of
categories for identifying such people. That language overlaps,
however, with the diagnostic language of mental health profes-
sionals, who employ schemes of classification to identify
mental dysfunctions, just as a physician diagnoses physical dys-
functions. The mental dysfunction itself may or may not
result in sexually deviant forms of behavior, just as an
inflamed throat may or may not lead to hoarseness. The
emphasis among mental health professionals is upon dysfunc-
tions that have been agreed upon by a medical community.
The outward behavior may be a symptom of the dysfunction,
but not a necessary condition for defining it.93
V. CONCLUSION
The difficulty with legal reforms is that, although they
often rely upon acts of imagination in their creation, they must
finally employ a language that is inadequate for such tasks.
The narrative authority giving rise to the reform is silenced by
the overriding demands of the language of the rule. The rule
contains its own kind of rhetorical authority, but that rhetoric
necessarily lacks the immediacy of narrative. In addition,
although every trial offers a retelling of the original story-in
another version-that retelling involves conflicting narratives
and competing ethical demands.
Furthermore, the process for legal reforms in situations
93. See WSPA Brief, supra note 81, at 3-5.
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such as that described here relies upon shifting audiences.
Whereas the social narratives of violence and pain began with
an audience, first of the community, then of a governor's task
force, and finally of legislators, the ultimate audience has
become the judiciary, which must respond to the original nar-
rative as translated by a rule and as retold in competing narra-
tives. Judges as readers are situated differently, and they read
for different purposes.
Some recent commentators have questioned whether nar-
ratives, no matter how compelling, can reliably initiate legal
reform.94 Here, the question is not so simple. The narratives
were compelling, and they did result in a new statute. The
statute, however, must translate the ethical imperatives of the
narrative into the general language of a rule. Even were the
language of the originating narrative to survive translation, the
retelling at trial has broadened the field of ethical imperatives
to which the narrative must respond. If the courts ultimately
uphold the conviction of the first two appellants, they will
have done so by silencing voices that have made due process
and equal protection claims. Legal interpretation imposes
silence, and pain, upon others.95 On the other hand, a reversal
would, in effect, deny the voices of pain and violence found in
the originating narratives, voices which demanded embodiment
in a statute and its application.9 Either decision, either judi-
cial reading, is an exercise of power.
It may be, however, that the judge wields something more
important than power. In making a decision, the judge must
also tell yet another version of the story and, in doing so, must
make an appeal once again to the community. The question,
ultimately, is that of how convincing is this appeal. In his most
recent work, James Boyd White has adopted the metaphor of
translation to describe this re-telling by the judge.97 In part,
White calls it "translation" because of the impossibility of writ-
ing a judicial opinion that does not encounter multiple stories,
that does not include some voices and exclude others, and that
94. See Symposium, Law, Literature, and Social Change, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1663
(1990).
95. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601-09 (1986).
96. Martha Minow claims that the courts all too often ignore these kinds of voices.
See Martha Minow, Comment, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law,
Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990).
97. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 224-25, 257 (1990).
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does not select certain details and fashion its own story.98
Translation as I am now defining it is thus the art of facing
the impossible, of confronting unbridgeable discontinuities
between texts, between languages, and between people. As
such it has an ethical as well as an intellectual dimen-
sion .... It requires one to discover both the value of the
other's language and the limits of one's own. Good transla-
tion thus proceeds not by the motives of dominance or acqui-
sition, but by respect.99
In this work, as in his others, White is arguing for a view of
law as a rhetorical activity, and thus an activity that can never
escape its deeply ethical nature. The judge, in wielding his or
her power, has a responsibility to the community as well as to
the law. The judge's decision cannot be purely scientific, the
product of a wholly linear calculus. It must also acknowledge
the limits of our own ways of understanding, the contingent
nature of the world we inhabit, and the chaos or silence that
always threatens to engulf the fragile communities we have
constructed.1°° It must be understood as another story, as
another retelling of the original narrative.
To suggest that the response of the courts to RCW 71.09 be
viewed as a retelling of the narrative is not to resolve the nor-
mative conflicts raised by the statute, nor to perfect statutory
definitions that may be unavoidably imperfect. No one is a god
or goddess these days; no one can adopt an omniscient view; no
one telling of a story can heal all pain and injustice. To return
to the suggestion made at the beginning of this Article, how-
ever, narratives as a rhetorical form may lie closest to the level
of our daily experience and, as such, may be one means for us
to evaluate the judicial response. Judicial decisions provide a
language for determining not only the adequacy of the facts or
the constitutionality of a rule, but also for determining whose
point of view should prevail in the story, whose voice must be
heard, and what the boundaries of the telling will be. In listen-
ing to the story, we can decide for ourselves how responsible
the teller has been to our shared social experiences, how ade-
quate the language has been to the telling.
The law, perhaps more than any other cultural activity, is
our predominant forum for telling our stories, and for asking
98. Id. at 262-63.
99. Id. at 257.
100. Id. at 40-41.
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that others listen. Sometimes the language of the law may be
inadequate to that telling. We may decide that it is inadequate
here, that we should search for another forum. What no one
would argue with is the need for the telling. The alternative is
to lose a sense of ourselves as a community. The alternative is
also a silence and a pain that lie beyond language, and thus
beyond our own limited and very human powers.
